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BOOLEAN NEGATION AND NON-CONSERVATIVITY I
RELEVANT MODAL LOGICS
TORE FJETLAND ØGAARD
Abstract: Many relevant logics can be conservatively ex-
tended by Boolean negation. Mares showed, however, that
E is a notable exception. Mares’ proof is by and large a
rather involved model-theoretic one. This paper presents
a much easier proof-theoretic proof which not only covers
E, but generalizes so as to also cover relevant logics with
a primitive modal operator added. It is shown that from
even very weak relevant logics augmented by a weak K-ish
modal operator, and up to the strong relevant logic R with a
S5 modal operator, all fail to be conservatively extended by
Boolean negation. The proof, therefore, also covers Meyer
and Mares’ proof that NR—R with a primitive S4-modality
added—also fails to be conservatively extended by Boolean
negation.
Keywords: Boolean negation, non-conservative extension,
entailment, modality, relevant logics
1. Introduction
Modern modal logic came about as an attempt at augmenting classical
logic with a connective which more plausibly than the material conditional
could be read “implies” or “entails”. Both C.I. Lewis and Hugh MacColl be-
fore him objected to reading the material conditional as “implies” which, for
instance, Whitehead and Russell did in Principia Mathematica. The most
provoking was the readings of the formulas A ⊃ (B ⊃ A) and ∼A ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
as, respectively, “a true proposition is implied by any proposition”, and “a
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false proposition implies any proposition”.1 These readings of these formu-
las are known as two of the paradoxes of material implication. To remedy
this, MacColl and Lewis introduced a strict implication, commonly symbol-
ized by ‘J’, where A J B is regarded as true when it is impossible that A is
true, but B is false. However, J, read as logical implication, has paradoxes
of its own: if A is necessarily true—such as a logical truth of classical
propositional logic—then B J A will be true too, and if A is necessarily
false, then A J B will be true. Thus both B J A ∨ ∼A and A ∧ ∼A J B
are true. That this is so is sometimes levied against the identification of
implication with the strict conditional and labeled paradoxes of strict impli-
cation.
Willhelm Ackermann began the study of logics free of both the para-
doxes of the material and the strict conditional and introduced the concept
of a rigorous implication with his 1956 essay Begründung einer strengen
Implikation ([1]). Like MacColl and Lewis, Ackermann wanted his logic
to be capable of expressing modal notions, but unlike them he didn’t make
any attempt at defining his rigorous implication in terms of modal and ex-
tensional notions.
The two paradoxes of the strict implication above express the key fea-
ture of a Boolean negation, that the conjunction of any contradictory pair
of propositions implies every proposition which in turn imply any instance
of a Boolean excluded middle. To avoid the paradoxes of the strict condi-
tional, therefore, the logic of negation must in some sense be weaker than
the Boolean negation. Relevant logics have since Ackermann’s essay there-
fore adopted the weaker De Morgan negation. Like Lewis and MacColl,
Anderson and Belnap also thought of entailment as a modal notion, and al-
though they found Ackermann’s logic intriguing, they took issue with some
minor features of it. These were found to be easily amendable, however:
by simply replacing Ackermann’s δ-rule A → (B → C), B ` A → C with
the axiom (((A → A) ∧ (B → B)) → C) → C, and deleting the γ-rule
A,∼A ∨ B ` B, they arrived at the logic called E for entailment.2 E does
not have implicational paradoxes, yet can express a S4-modality through a
definable modal operator, namely 2A =d f (A→ A)→ A.
1For instance, Whitehead and Russell write with regards to the first:
The most important propositions proved in the present number are the
following:
∗2·02. `: q. ⊃ .p ⊃ q
I.e. q implies that p implies q, i.e. a true proposition is implied by any
proposition. ([23, p. 103])
2Ackermann explicitly demanded the δ-rule to be restricted to cases where the second
premise was a logical truth. δ taken this way turns out to be derivable also in E, and
so, arguably, the only difference between the logics is that the latter does not have γ as a
primitive rule.
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Although the standard relevant negation has ever been the De Morgan
one, Robert Meyer and Richard Routley started in the seventies to inves-
tigate so-called classical relevant logics—relevant logics with a Boolean
negation added as an additional primitive negation. One of the hallmarks
of relevant logics is the variable sharing property, that if A → B is a logi-
cal truth, then A and B share a propositional variable. Thus since, to quote
Belnap, “commonality of meaning is carried by identity of propositional
variables” ([3, p. 144]), for an object-language entailment statement to be
true, the relata need to be content-wise related, which was one of the orig-
inal requirements of Ackermann. The key feature of a Boolean negation
explicitly violates this, but it turned out that one can preserve the variable
sharing property for the Boolean free fragment if such a negation is added
to just about any relevant logic.3 Not only does such an extension preserve
one of the key ideas of relevant logics, but it turned out that the extension
is in many cases also conservative. But then again, not always. This is the
case with E. As a consequence of Meyer and Dunn’s proof of the admis-
sibility of γ for E ([11]) it follows that if A is a classical tautology, then
any substitutional instance of it is an E-theorem. Thus E extends classi-
cal logic theorem-vise. Since its modal operator expresses a S4-modality,
the question arises whether this extends to classical modal logic S4 as well.
This, however, is not the case as Mares showed in [8] that the extensional
K-sentence 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is not a theorem of E, although it is
a theorem of E extended by Boolean negation. The extension is therefore
non-conservative.
Mares’ proof is by and large a rather involved model-theoretic one. This
paper presents a much easier proof-theoretic proof which also holds for sig-
nificantly weaker logic, as well as the S5-extension of E. Although it is
easy to extend E so as to make the definable 2 into a S5 modality, it is
not clear how to weaken E and E5 so as to make 2 into the other standard
modalities K, D, T and B.4 The most interesting feature of the proof, how-
ever, is that it generalizes to the case where the modal operator is taken as
primitive. Meyer and Mares showed in [12] that 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B)
fails to be a theorem also of the relevant logic R extended by a primitive S4
modality, but that it is a theorem of its Boolean extension. Thus also this
logic, NR, fails to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Surely
there most be a common explanation, and the proof to be given shows forth
three common denominators:
(1) the meta-rule of reasoning by cases,
(2) the derivability of γ in the Boolean extension,
3There are no exceptions for sublogics of R. There are, however, exceptions. One such is
exhibited in [15].
4A very interesting first step in this direction is Mares and Standefer’s [7]. So far, however,
their approach only pertains to the negation-free fragment, and since negation is the heart
of the topic at hand, I will not discuss that paper further.
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(3) that the modal operator is such that it distributes over true impli-
cations, that is if B is derivable from A, then 2B is derivable from
2A.
We shall see that this latter property holds not only of E’s 2, but of any
primitive K-ish modal operator over quite weak relevant logics.
The structure of the proof is as follows:
(1) A, A ⊃ B ` B, where A ⊃ B =d f ∼A ∨ B, is a derivable rule in the
Boolean extension.
(2) The properties of 2 are such that the meta-rule
(2/`-dist) A ` B
2A ` 2B ,
is provable for in the Boolean extension.
(3) From (1) and (2) we get that 2A,2(A ⊃ B) ` 2B is a derivable rule.
(4) The meta-rule of reasoning by cases,
(RbC) A ` C B ` CA ∨ B ` C ,
is available in the Boolean extension.
(5) Using (3) and (4), then, we get that 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is a
theorem (excluded middle is assumed).
(6) 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is not a theorem of in the Boolean-free
logic.
(7) Hence: the Boolean extension is non-conservative.
The plan for the paper is as follows: Sect. 2 gives some common defi-
nitions before Sect. 3 gives a quick presentation of Mares’ proof. Sect. 4
provides a standard proof of reasoning by cases using the pseudo modus
ponens axiom A ∧ (A → B) → B. Sect. 4.1 gives a brief walk-through of
ways to enthymematically weaken the logic without loosing reasoning by
cases. Sect. 5 shows that 2 distributes over true implications and the short
Sect. 5 discusses possible weakenings. Sect. 6 shows that γ is a derivable
rule in any Boolean extension of a logic for which (De Morgan) excluded
middle is a theorem. Sect. 6.1 then gives two new proofs of reasoning by
cases pertaining only to the Boolean extension. A discussion regarding the
Boolean axiom (A → B) = (A = B), where = is the Boolean material
implication, is given in light of this. Sect. 6.2 then summarizes the possible
enthymematic weakenings discussed before Sect. 7 gives the main result
with regards to E. Sect. 7.1 then introduces the notion of a disjunctive rule
and shows how to further weaken the requirements in light of this.
Sect. 8 and Sect. 8.1 shows that the main result and its weakening using
disjunctive rules can be generalized to the case where the modal operator is
taken as primitive. Sect. 9 gives a slight variation in order to show that the
logics DKd and TKd are not conservatively extended by Boolean negation,
either, and thus solving a problem posed by Restall in [17]. Sect. 10 then
finally summarizes.
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This is the first of in all three essays on Boolean negation and non-
conservativeness pertaining to relevant logics. The second essay, [15], deals
with the question whether the variable sharing property is always preserved
when extending a logic with Boolean negation, whereas the third essay,
[16], deals with the question whether relevant logics with the truth-constant
known as the Ackermann constant can be conservatively extended by Boolean
negation. Together the three essays paint a picture of relevant logics being
quite often non-conservatively extended by Boolean negation. It should
therefore be noted that many relevant logics in fact are conservatively ex-
tended by Boolean negation. Neither of the three papers make any effort to
survey such proofs, however. The interested reader should consult [4], [6],
[13] and [17].
2. Definitions and common lemmas
This section simply gives some definitions of various relevant logics and
then proves some useful lemmas. As a start, all proofs in this essay will be
standard Hilbert-style proofs:
Definition 1 (Hilbert proof). A Hilbert proof of a formula A from a set of
formulas Γ in the logic L is defined to be a finite list A1, . . . , An such that
An = A and every Ai≤n is either a member of Γ, a logical axiom of L, or
there is a set ∆ ⊆ {A j| j < i} such that ∆ ` Ai is an instance of a rule of L.
The existential claim that there is such a proof is is written Γ `L A.
BB A1–A5, R1–R7 T TW +A12, +A13
B BB +A6, +A7, −R5, −R6 E T +A14, +A15
DW B +A8, −R7 R T (or E) +A11
TW DW +A9, +A10, −R3, −R4 LX L +A12[
EW TW +R8 CL L +B1–B2
RW TW +A11 C]L CL +B3
Table 1. Definitions of various relevant logics
Definition 2.
2A =d f (A→ A)→ A
A ⊃ B =d f ∼A ∨ B De Morgan material implication
A = B =d f ¬A ∨ B Boolean material implication
eA =d f A→ A
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(A1) A→ A identity
(A2) A→ A ∨ B and B→ A ∨ B ∨-introduction
(A3) A ∧ B→ A and A ∧ B→ B ∧-elimination
(A4) ∼∼A→ A double negation elimination
(A5) A ∧ (B ∨C)→ (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧C) distribution
(A6) (A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)→ (A→ B ∧C) strong lattice ∧
(A7) (A→ C) ∧ (B→ C)→ (A ∨ B→ C) strong lattice ∨
(A8) (A→ ∼B)→ (B→ ∼A) contraposition axiom
(A9) (A→ B)→ ((B→ C)→ (A→ C)) suffixing axiom
(A10) (A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B)) prefixing axiom
(A11) A→ ((A→ B)→ B) assertion axiom
(A12[) A ∨ ∼A excluded middle
(A12) (A→ ∼A)→ ∼A reductio
(A13[) A ∧ (A→ B)→ B pseudo modus ponens
(A13) (A→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B) contraction axiom
(A14) ((A→ A)→ B)→ B 1. E-distinctive axiom
(A15) 2A ∧2B→ 2(A ∧ B) 2. E-distinctive axiom
(B1) A ∧ ¬A→ B Boolean explosion axiom
(B2) A→ B ∨ ¬B Boolean excl. middle axiom
(B3) (A→ B) = (A = B) Boolean interaction axiom
(R1) A, B ` A ∧ B adjunction
(R2) A, A→ B ` B modus ponens
(R3) A→ B ` (B→ C)→ (A→ C) suffixing rule
(R4) A→ B ` (C → A)→ (C → B) prefixing rule
(R5) A→ B, A→ C ` A→ B ∧C lattice ∧-rule
(R6) A→ C, B→ C ` A ∨ B→ C lattice ∨-rule
(R7) A→ ∼B ` B→ ∼A contraposition rule
(R8) A→ (B→ C), B ` A→ C δ
(R9) A,∼A ∨ B ` B γ
Axiom A12[, A ∨ ∼A is in fact interderivable in BB with the rule version
of reductio, axiom A12. Similarly, axiom A13[ is interderivable with the
rule version of the contraction axiom, A13. This, then, is the reason behind
the superscripted ‘[’.
Definition 3 (Admissible rule). A rule Γ ` A is an admissible rule in L if it
is the case that ∅ `L A when ∅ `L B for all B ∈ Γ.
Definition 4 (Boolean extension). CL is called the Boolean extension of L.
Definition 5 (Strong Boolean extension). C]L is called the strong Boolean
extension of L.
Definition 6 (Conservative Extension). If L1 and L2 are logics over, re-
spectively, languages L1 and L2 such that L1 ⊆ L2, then L2 conservatively
extends L1 if ∅ `L1 A for every L1-formula A such that ∅ `L2 A.
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Lemma 1 (Basic logical properties). Any logic extending BB has the fol-
lowing derived rules:
(DR1) A→ B ` A ∨C → B ∨C
(DR2) A→ B ` A ∧C → B ∧C
(DR3) (A ∨C), (B ∨C) ` (A ∧ B) ∨C
Proof. Left for the reader. 
3. Mares’ proof and an E-counter-model to the extensional K-sentence
Mares showed in [8] that the extensional K-sentence 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃
2B) is derivable in the Boolean extension of E and therefore—since the
sentence is not a theorem of E—that the extension is non-conservative. The
most interesting fact and main feature of Mares’ proof is that every model
for CE contains a model for the classical modal logic S4. By letting τ be the
simple translation from the S4-language to the E-language which translates
∧S4 to ∧E, ∼S4 to ∼E and 2S4 to 2E. Mares shows that every CE-model
will validate the τ-translation of every logical theorem of S4, and therefore
2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) for every A and B got from any S4-formula via
τ. By the soundness theorem of S4 and the completeness theorem of CE
(supplied by Mares), it follows that CE is a non-conservative extension of
E.
There are two things that should be noted concerning Mares’ proof. First
of all it should be noted that his proof does not show that 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃
(2A ⊃ 2B) is a general theorem of CE, only that it is for assorted A’s
and B’s. This is reflected in Mares’ statement of the theorem which uses
propositional variables and not metalinguistic variables over formulas as in
the other results of his paper. The proof to be given in this paper shows that
the extensional K-sentence is a general CE-theorem.
The second thing to note is that Mares defines E and CE rather differently
than what I have done in this paper. The Boolean extension is got by adding
the rule A = B ` A→ B provided A = B is a substitution instance of a clas-
sical tautology. This obviously suffices for yielding B1 and B2 as logical
theorems. Mares defines E slightly differently as well. Most importantly he
defines it to include both the Ackermann constant t as well an intensional
conjunction, ◦, called fusion. Note, then, that the Ackermann constant can
be add conservatively to E as here defined.5 The addition of the fusion con-
nective is a bit trickier: using the Boolean rule it yields A ◦ B → C ∨ ¬C
as a theorem, from which the rules for ◦ yield A → (B → C ∨ ¬C). This
is not a theorem of CE as here defined.6 However, Mares’ version of E is
known to be a conservative extension of E as defined here, and so his proof
does suffice for establishing his result.7 That CE, as here defined, suffices,
5See [2, lem. 2] for a proof which obviously also covers E.
6The B2 axiom is sometimes taken to be this stronger axiom A → (B → C ∨ ¬C) (cf. [6]
and [17]).
7See the first appendix of [20] for a proof that ◦ can be added conservatively to E.
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then, goes to show that Mares’ result does not require a stronger Boolean
extension than that got by adding only B1 and B2.
I will show forth a much simpler proof of Mares’ result which also holds
for logics slightly weaker and slightly stronger than E. We will also see that
it can be modified to cover different logics as well.
Mares showed forth a model for E which invalidates 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃
2B). There are three points that I wish to make regarding it.
(1) First of all note that E’s 2 is a S4-modality. E can, however, easily
be extended to yield S5-modality; as in classical modal logic, one
can simply add the Brouwerian axiom A → 23A. Mares’ model
also validates this extended logic, E5, and so also this logic fails to
be conservatively extended by Boolean negation.
(2) In the sketch of the proof to be given, the only property needed from
the Boolean extension is that it yields γ, that is modus ponens for
⊃, as a derivable rule. However, simply adding this rule to E does
not suffice for deriving 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B), although Mares’
model does not show this since it does not validate the rule.8
(3) Mares uses a version of E which is endowed with the fusion con-
nective. Although the primitive rules for ◦ are the residuation rules
(◦I) A→ (B→ C) ` A ◦ B→ C
(◦E) A ◦ B→ C ` A→ (B→ C),
(A ◦ B→ C) → (A → (B→ C)) is a theorem of E augmented with
these rules, whereas (A→ (B→ C))→ (A ◦ B→ C) is not. Mares’
model does not validate this latter axiom form of the (◦I)-rule. The
algebraic counter-model displayed in Fig. 1 validates E5t◦
+
[γ]—E
augmented with γ as a new primitive rule, the Brouwerian axiom,
the axiomatic versions of the (◦I)- and (◦E)-axioms, as well as t→
(A→ A) and (t→ A)→ A—the axioms for t.9
The counter-model to 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) in Fig. 1 consists, like
all models to be displayed in this paper, of a displyed partial ordering over
which conjunction and disjunction are to be interpreted as, respectively,
8That the proof does not, therefore, extend to Ackermann’s logic is further explained in
the parenthetical in Sect. 7. Mares’ model is a Routley-Meyer model and consists of three
“worlds”—0, 1 and 2. The first two are the “regular” worlds which the rules need to be
truth-preserving over. 0 is a consistent and complete world—it validates either A or ∼A for
every A and never both; 2 is a gappy world—it fails to validate either t or ∼t, where t is
the Ackermann constant; whereas 1 is an inconsistent world in that it validates both t and
∼t. Since 1 validates both t and t ⊃ A for every A, but does not validate every such A, it
follows that Mares’ model fails to validate γ, that is, modus ponens for ⊃.
9Note that Mares states the rules of E to be logically theorem-preserving. Adjunction is, for
instance, stated as ` A& ` B⇒` A∧B. Mares axiomatizes t using the axiom (t→ A)→ A
and the logical theorem-preserving rule ` A ⇒` t → A. Note, then, that the meta-rule
that t → A is a logical theorem if A is, is provable using the axioms specified here, and
t → (A → A) is obviously a theorem using Mares’ t-rule. The two axiomatizations of t
are, therefore, equivalent.
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infimum and supremum. Alongside there will be a matrix which shows how
the conditional and the negation(s) are to be interpreted and possible other
connective. A subset T of the algebra—a filter to be precise—is selected
as the set of designated elements. A rule holds in an algebra just in case the
conclusion is assigned a value in T when all its premises are. I also list how
to interpret the relevant formulas so as to make the model a counter-model
to the intended formula.10
Theorem 1. 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is not a theorem of E5t◦
+
[γ].
Proof. A counter-model is displayed in Fig. 1.



















→ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ∼ 2 3
0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 0
1 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 6 0 3
2 0 3 4 3 4 3 4 7 5 0 4
3 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 7 4 3 3
4 0 0 0 3 4 3 4 7 3 4 4
5 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 7 2 3 7
6 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 1 4 7
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 7 7
⊃ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7
2 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 7
3 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 7
4 3 3 4 3 4 5 6 7
5 2 2 2 4 4 6 6 7
6 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 3 3 5 5 7
2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 0 1 1 3 3 5 5 7
4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
6 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Figure 1. E5t4◦
+
[γ]-counter-model to 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B)

4. Reasoning by cases and pseudo modus ponens
The outline of the proof given mentioned reasoning by cases as one in-
gredient. Reasoning by cases, in the simplest case, can be stated as
(RbC) A ` C B ` CA ∨ B ` C ,
10All models depicted in this paper have been found with the help of MaGIC—an acronym
for Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives—which is an open source computer pro-
gram created by John K. Slaney ([22]). I have made heavy use of both it as well as William
McCune’s theorem prover/model generator package Prover9/Mace4 ([9]) in arriving at the
results reported in this essay.
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and reads: if there is a proof of C from the assumption of A and also a proof
of C from the assumption of B, then there is a proof of C from assumption
of A∨ B. Reasoning by cases is thus not a rule, but a meta-rule; a statement
about the derivability relation `.
I will provide three different proofs of reasoning by cases; one which
utilizes pseudo modus ponens, the axiom A ∧ (A → B) → B, one which
uses the reductio axiom (A → ∼A) → ∼A in the Boolean extension, and
one which makes use of the third Boolean axiom (A → B) = (A = B).
To avoid having to repeat too much, I will now show forth a well-known
and simple lemma which show that the question whether RbC holds, can be
reduced to the simpler meta-rule that B∨C is provable from A∨C provided
B is provable from A.
Lemma 2.
(∨/`-dist) A ` BA ∨C ` B ∨C =⇒ (RbC)
A ` C B ` C
A ∨ B ` C
Proof. Assume that A ` C and B ` C. By the assumption of the meta-rule
∨/`-dist together with the commutativity of ∨, we get that A ∨ B ` B ∨ C




A ∨C ` B ∨C
holds for any logic L which extends BB[A13[]—BB with the pseudo modus
ponens axiom A∧ (A→ B)→ B added—provided L has no more primitive
rules than modus ponens and adjunction.
Proof. Assume that D1, . . . ,Dn is a proof of B from A. The goal is to show
that A ∨C ` Di ∨C for all i ≤ n.
First if Di is either an axiom or is identical to A, then obviously we have
that A ∨ C ` Di ∨ C. For induction hypothesis assume that A ∨ C ` Di ∨ C
and A ∨ C ` D j ∨ C and Dk is got from Di and D j using adjunction. Using
Lem. 1 (DR3) we get A ∨ C ` (Di ∧ D j) ∨ C. Assume now that Dk is got
from Di and D j = Di → Dk using modus ponens. Since A13[ is an axiom
of L, we get (Di∧ (Di → Dk))∨C → Dk∨C from Di∧ (Di → Dk)→ Dk by
using Lem. 1 (DR1). As before we get that A∨C ` (Di∧(Di → Dk)∨C, and
therefore A ∨C ` Dk ∨C. This ends the proof for logics with A13[.11 
Corollary 1. RbC is a provable meta-rule of E and CE, as well as of E5
and CE5.
4.1. Possible weakenings. Note the restriction on not having further prim-
itive rules than adjunction and modus ponens. Beyond this, however, it is
only the assumption of pseudo modus ponens, i.e. A13[, which is a sub-
stantial assumption. We will later see two other proofs which do away with
11The proof given here is essentially that given by Meyer and Dunn in [11, p. 462f].
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this assumption and instead require properties of the Boolean extension to
go through.
TW is the weakest of the commonly refered to relevant logics which has
only adjunction and modus ponens as primitive rules, and so TW[A13[]
is the weakest such logic which is covered by the above result on RbC.
However, TW[A13[] can be weakened significantly. The following en-
thymemized versions of the TW[A13[]-axioms would, as the reader can
easily check, do just as well for the above RbC-proof, and, unless other-
wise stated, just as well also in any other proof in this paper. For readability
I’ll use eA as short for A→ A.
(eA6) ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)) ∧ eA → (A→ B ∧C)
(eA7) ((A→ C) ∧ (B→ C)) ∧ eA → (A ∨ B→ C)
(eA8) (A→ ∼B) ∧ eA → (B→ ∼A)
(eA9) (A→ B) ∧ eC → ((B→ C)→ (A→ C))
(eA10) (A→ B) ∧ eC → ((C → A)→ (C → B))
(eA13[) (A ∧ (A→ B)) ∧ eB → B
5. Modal properties
The purpose of this section is simply to show that the meta-rule
(2/`-dist) A ` B
2A ` 2B ,
which states that the necessity operator distributes over true implications,
holds for E and CE and to show what logical properties are needed for it to
be provable.
Lemma 3. A→ B `BB[A14] 2(A→ B)
Proof.
(1) A→ B assumption
(2) (A→ A)→ (A→ B) 1, R4
(3) ((A→ B)→ (A→ B))→ ((A→ A)→ (A→ B)) 2, R3
(4) ((A→ A)→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B) A14
(5) ((A→ B)→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B) 3, 4, transitivity
(6) 2(A→ B) 5, def. of 2

Lemma 4. A→ B,2A `BB[A14] 2B
Proof.
(1) A→ B assumption
(2) 2A assumption
(3) (A→ A)→ B 1, 2, transitivity
(4) (B→ B)→ ((A→ A)→ B) 3, R3
(5) ((A→ A)→ B)→ B A14
(6) 2B 4, 5, transitivity & def. of 2
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
Theorem 3.
(2/`-dist) A ` B
2A ` 2B ,
holds for any logic L which extends BB[A14|A15], BB extended by the two
E-distinctive axioms
(A14) ((A→ A)→ B)→ B 1. E-distinctive axiom
(A15) 2A ∧2B→ 2(A ∧ B) 2. E-distinctive axiom,
by rules the main connective of the conclusion of which is→, or axioms the
main connective of which is→.
Proof. Assume that D1, . . . ,Dn is a proof of B from A. The proof is an
induction to the effect that 2A ` 2Di for every i. If Di is A, then obviously
2A ` 2Di. If Di is an axiom, then as all axioms of L are →-formulas,
Lem. 3 ensures that 2Di is a theorem, and so 2A ` 2Di.
Assume for inductive hypothesis that both 2A ` 2Di and 2A ` 2D j and
Dk is got from Di and D j by adjunction. Using adjunction we can infer that
2A ` 2Di ∧ 2D j. Using the A15 axiom 2Di ∧ 2D j → 2(Di ∧ D j) and
modus ponens we then get that 2A ` 2(Di ∧ D j). Assume now that Dk
is got from Di and D j = Di → Dk by modus ponens. From the induction
hypothesis we get that 2A ` 2Di and 2A ` 2(Di → Dk) and therefore
2A ` Di → Dk. Lem. 4 then suffices for 2A ` 2Dk.
Now assume that Dk is got by any of the other primitive rules of BB.
Since 2A ` A is derivable we can infer the hypothesis of rule used to derive
Dk from their necessitated hypothesis in the induction proof. Using this one
then derives Dk itself using the rule in question. Since this is a→-formula,
we can then use Lem. 3 to conclude that 2A ` 2Dk which then ends the
proof. Thus, for instance, from the inductive hypothesis that 2A ` 2Di,
where Di = E → B, and Dk = (B → C) → (E → C) is got by using the
R3 rule, simply infer 2A ` E → B from 2A ` 2(E → B), then infer 2A `
(B → C) → (E → C) using R3 and lastly 2A ` 2((B → C) → (E → C))
using Lem. 3. 
Corollary 2.
(2/`-dist) A ` B
2A ` 2B
holds for both E and CE.
If we abstract away from the particular definition of 2 and considers
instead a primitive modal operator  it is worth mentioning the following:
Corollary 3.
(/`-dist) A ` BA ` B
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is derivable in any logic extending TW augmented by necessitation rule for
 as well as both the K and the /∧-distribution axioms:
(-Nec) ∅ ` A
∅ ` A
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
(/∧-dist) A ∧B→ (A ∧ B)
Proof. Simple induction similar to that of Thm. 3. 
I will get back to this result later on.
5.1. Possible weakenings. The proof that 2 distributes over true implica-
tions relied on three essential assumptions beyond that necessarily supplied
by BB:
(1) Every axiom needs to be a→ formula: needed to ensure that∅ ` 2A
for every axiom A.
(2) A14: used in both Lem. 3 and Lem. 4 which Thm. 3 relies on.
(3) A15: used in Thm. 3 to ensure that 2A,2B ` 2(A∧B) is a derivable
rule.
I will get back to the first requirement after the next section on the Boolean
lemmas. With regards to A14 and A15 it is easy to verify that the proof of
the (2/`-dist) meta-rule would still go through if A14 and A15 were en-
thymemized to the following versions:
(eA14) ((A→ A)→ B) ∧ eB → B
(eA15) (2A ∧2B) ∧ eA → 2(A ∧ B)
6. Boolean lemmas
Lemma 5. A→ ¬B `CBB B→ ¬A
Proof.
(1) A→ ¬B assumption
(2) B ∧ A→ B ∧ ¬B 1, fiddling
(3) B ∧ ¬B→ ¬A B1
(4) B ∧ A→ ¬A 2, 3, transitivity of→
(5) B ∧ ¬A→ ¬A A3
(6) (B ∧ A) ∨ (B ∧ ¬A)→ ¬A 4, 5, R6
(7) B ∧ (A ∨ ¬A)→ (B ∧ A) ∨ (B ∧ ¬A) A5
(8) B ∧ (A ∨ ¬A)→ ¬A 6, 7, transitivity of→
(9) B→ A ∨ ¬A B2
(10) B→ B ∧ (A ∨ ¬A) 9, A1 + R6
(11) B→ ¬A 8, 10, transitivity of→

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Corollary 4 (Boolean facts). The following are all theorems of CBB:
(BF1) ¬¬A↔ A
(BF2) ¬(A ∨ B)↔ (¬A ∧ ¬B)
(BF3) ¬(A ∧ B)↔ (¬A ∨ ¬B)
(BF4) A ∧ (A = B)→ B
(BF5) (A = B) ∧ (B = C) = (A = C)
(BF6) (A = B) = (A ∨C = B ∨C)
Proof. Left for the reader. 
It can also be shown that ¬∼A↔ ∼¬A is a theorem of CBB. The Boolean
negation (¬) and the De Morgan negation (∼) are importantly different,
however. For instance, (A → ¬B) → (B → ¬A), and the other versions
of the contraposition axiom fail to be theorems even in CR, although every
such corresponding rule is derivable in CBB.
Corollary 5. A→ B `CBB A = B
Proof.
(1) A→ B assumption
(2) A ∧ ¬B→ B ∧ ¬B 1, fiddling
(3) B ∧ ¬B→ ¬(A→ A) B1
(4) A ∧ ¬B→ ¬(A→ A) 2, 3, transitivity
(5) (A→ A)→ ¬(A ∧ ¬B) 4, Lem. 5
(6) (A→ A)→ (A = B) 5, Cor. 4 + fiddling
(7) A = B 6, A1 + R2

Lemma 6. A `CBBX ∼¬A
Proof.
(1) A ∧ ¬A→ ∼¬A B2
(2) A ∧ ∼¬A→ ∼¬A A3
(3) (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ (A ∧ ∼¬A)→ ∼¬A 1, 2, R6
(4) ¬A ∨ ∼¬A A12
(5) A assumption
(6) A ∧ (¬A ∨ ∼¬A) 4, 6, R1
(7) (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ (A ∧ ∼¬A) 6, A5
(8) ∼¬A 3, 7, R1

Theorem 4. γ, i.e. the rule A,∼A∨ B ` B, is derivable in any logic extend-
ing CBBX.
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Proof.
(1) A assumption
(2) ∼A ∨ B assumption
(3) ∼¬A 1, Lem. 6
(4) ∼¬A ∧ (∼A ∨ B) 2, 3, R1
(5) (∼¬A ∧ ∼A) ∨ (∼¬A ∧ B) 4, A5, R2
(6) ∼B→ A ∨ ¬A B2
(7) ∼A ∧ ∼¬A→ B 6, fiddling
(8) ∼¬A ∧ B→ B A3
(9) (∼¬A ∧ ∼A) ∨ (∼¬A ∧ B)→ B 7, 8, R6
(10) B 5, 9, R2

Corollary 6. γ is derivable in CE.
«Parenthetical remark. Relevant logics have traditionally been paracon-
sistent and therefore do not include γ.12 However, there has been consider-
able interest in showing that the logical theorems of the various logics are
closed under this rule; that B is a logical theorem if both A and ∼A ∨ B are.
This is the problem of the admissibility of γ which was solved in the posi-
tive for both R, E and T by Meyer and Dunn in [11]. The above theorem
shows that γ is in fact derivable in the Boolean extension of any logic with
excluded middle. From this it follows that the admissibility of γ is a nec-
essary condition for such a logic to be conservatively extended by Boolean
negation:
Corollary 7. γ is admissible in any logic L extending BBX, provided CL
is a conservative extension of L.
Proof. Assume that both `L A and `L A ⊃ B. From the above lemma it now
follows that `CL B and since B is Boolean-free and CL is a conservative
extension of L, it then follows that `L B. End parenthetical.» 
6.1. Two Boolean proofs of reasoning by cases. The proof of reasoning
by cases above (Thm. 2) made use of A13[—the pseudo modus ponens
axiom. I will now show forth two other proof of reasoning by cases, one
which makes use of axiom A12—the reductio axiom (A → ∼A) → ∼A—
together with the fact that γ is a derivable rule in CBBX, and another one
which makes use of the B3 axiom (A→ B) = (A = B).
Lemma 7.
A ` B
A ∨C ` B ∨C
holds in any logic CL where L extends BB[A12], and in any logic C]L
where L extends BB, provided only adjunction and modus ponens are prim-
itive rules L.
12Ackermann’s Π′, as well as the logic Π′E presented in [14] are worth mentioning as
exceptions. See the latter paper for a discussion of why relevant logics ended up being
wrongly viewed as inherently paraconsistent.
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Proof. The proof is again an induction. The base case and the inductive
case for adjunction is quite similar to that of Thm. 2, and so is left for the
reader.
Assume for inductive hypothesis that A∨C ` Di ∨C and A∨C ` (Di →
D j)∨C. The reductio axiom is in fact interderivable with (A→ B)→ (A ⊃
B), and so yields (Di → D j) → (Di ⊃ D j) and therewith (Di → D j) ∨ C →
(Di ⊃ D j)∨C. We can then detatch and thus get that A∨C ` (Di ⊃ D j)∨C.
From this and the other hypothesis we get A ∨ C ` (Di ∧ (Di ⊃ D j)) ∨ C
by distribution fiddling. (Di ∧ (Di ⊃ D j)) ⊃ D j is a theorem of BB[A12]
from which we get (Di ∧ (Di ⊃ D j)) ∨ C ⊃ D j ∨ C by fiddling. Since
reductio is assumed, excluded middle is a theorem and so Thm. 4 entails
that modus ponens holds for ⊃ (γ). By using γ we can therefore detach to
get A ∨C ` D j ∨C.
The proof using the B3-axiom (A → B) = (A = B) of C]L is quite
similar and is therefore left for the reader. 
From the above lemma we get the following corollary:
Corollary 8.
A ` B
A ∨C ` B ∨C
holds in both C]TW, C]TWX and in CTW[A12].
Note that this last result on reasoning by cases can by itself be used to
show non-conservativity:
Theorem 5. C]TWX is not a conservative extension of TWX.
Proof. Since excluded middle is an axiom of TWX, and reasoning by cases
is derivable in C]TWX (Cor. 8), we get that ∼(A∧(A→ B))∨B is a theorem
of C]TWX. This is, however, not a theorem of even CTWX (counter-model











→ 0 1 2 3 ∼ ¬
0 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 2 3 2 3 2 2
2 2 2 3 3 1 1
3 2 2 2 3 0 0
Figure 2. A CTWX-counter-model to ∼(A ∧ (A→ B)) ∨ B

The mere addition of reasoning by cases is not sufficient for non-conservativeness
in the case of TW since this logic is itself prime14 ([21, cor. 1]). Primeness,
13This is in fact the model used by Giambrone and Meyer to show that B3 is independent
from B1 and B2 over TW ([6, pp. 2f]).
14So that A ∨ B is a theorem of TW if and only if at least one of the disjuncts are.
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however, is a different property than that of reasoning by cases which is not
provable for TW:
Corollary 9. Reasoning by cases does not hold for TW.
Proof. Since both
A ∧ (A→ B) ` ∼(A ∧ (A→ B)) ∨ B
∼(A ∧ (A→ B)) ` ∼(A ∧ (A→ B)) ∨ B,
reasoning by cases would yield that
(A ∧ (A→ B)) ∨ ∼(A ∧ (A→ B)) ` ∼(A ∧ (A→ B)) ∨ B
which the model in Fig. 2 shows is not the case. 
The Boolean extension of a relevant logic is sometimes taken to include
the B3-axiom (A→ B) = (A = B). This is the case in both Giambrone and
Meyer’s joint paper [6], and Restall’s paper [17]. Neither paper provide any
argument for defining the Boolean extension to include B3, the reason for
including it, it seems, is to get a so-called reduced semantics.15 It should,
however, be noted that B3 is rather different from the other two Boolean
axioms: whereas B1 and B2 simply express that any instance of a Boolean
excluded middle is entailed by every formula and a Boolean contradiction
entails everything, B3 expresses that any relevant conditional either fails to
be true, or the Boolean material conditional is true, or to put it equivalently;
either the premises of any instance of modus ponens holds, or its conclusion
does. Since B3 is equivalent to A ∧ (A → B) = B, and A → B ` A =
B is a derivable rule of even CBB, it follows that the axiom is derivable
in any logic with the pseudo modus ponens axiom A ∧ (A → B) → B
which, again, is interderivable in BB with the rule of contraction, i.e. A →
(A → B) ` A → B. Furthermore, if reasoning by cases is available, then
B3 will obviously also be a theorem. It seems, however, that for some
contraction free logics for which reasoning by cases is not provable, the B3
axiom simply is too strong; the non-conservativity in the case of TWX is at
least got rather easily if we were only to consider Boolean logics with the
B3-axiom. Whether CTWX is a conservative extension of TWX is a matter
that is, as far as I know, unresolved. To further emphasize how strong the
B3-axiom is, note that it even makes it possible to re-axiomatize any logic
so as to replace adjunction with the Boolean axiom A = (B = A ∧ B) and
→-modus ponens with Boolean material modus ponens, i.e. A, A = B ` B.
Thus it seems that C]L is too strong in some cases where CL may not be,
and so I have found it prudent to distinguish between C]L and CL.
6.2. Summary over possible enthymematic weakenings. The main re-
sult of this section, Thm. 4, was that γ, i.e. the rule A, A ⊃ B ` B is derivable
in CBBX. The main theorem of this paper makes use of this, and so relies
on the presence of excluded middle. However, the proof that 2 distributes
15Giambrone and Meyer’s use of B3 is in their proof of Fact 1 ([6, p. 4]) which states that
any set of formulas containing all the axioms is also closed under modus ponens.
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over true implications, Thm. 3, relied on every axiom of the logic being a
→-formula. For this reason we need to beef excluded middle up to such a
→ formula which suffices for deriving excluded middle. The reductio ax-
iom, of course, would suffice, but so would any enthymemized version of
it. As the reductio axiom is equivalent to the axiom (A → B) → (A ⊃ B),
one such version would be
(eA12) (A→ B) ∧ eA → (A ⊃ B)
which also suffices for the proof of Lem. 7. Another possible way would be
to simply weaken it to the necessitated excluded middle axiom
(X2) 2(A ∨ ∼A),
which turns out to be properly weaker than the eA12-axiom.
To sum up some of the possible ways to enthymematically weaken E
while still making sure reasoning by cases is provable, that 2 distributes
over true implications, and that γ is a derivable rule in the Boolean extension
is then to augment BB by the following axioms and deleting any primitive
rule of BB save adjunction and modus ponens:
(eA6) ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)) ∧ eA → (A→ B ∧C)
(eA7) ((A→ C) ∧ (B→ C)) ∧ eA → (A ∨ B→ C)
(eA8) (A→ ∼B) ∧ eA → (B→ ∼A)
(eA9) (A→ B) ∧ eC → ((B→ C)→ (A→ C))
(eA10) (A→ B) ∧ eC → ((C → A)→ (C → B))
(eA12) (A→ B) ∧ eA → (A ⊃ B)
(eA14) ((A→ A)→ B) ∧ eB → B
(eA15) (2A ∧2B) ∧ eA → 2(A ∧ B)
If eA12 is weakened to X2, one needs to add modus ponens in some
axiomatic form to ensure that the first proof of reasoning by cases (Thm. 2).
Adding A13[ suffices, but so does any enthymemized version such as (A ∧
(A → B)) ∧ eA → B. Lastly, one could stick with excluded middle (A12[),
but then one would have to beef up the Boolean assumptions with the B3
axiom (A→ B) = (A = B) in order for, again, reasoning by cases to hold.
7. Main theorem
It’s now time to give the proof of 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B).
Theorem 6. Any sublogic L of E5t4◦
+
[γ] for which
(1) excluded middle is a theorem of L;
(2) 2 distributes over true implications in CL;
(3) reasoning by cases is provable for CL,
fails to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation.
Proof. 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is not a theorem of E5t4◦
+
[γ] by Thm. 1.
However, it is derivable in CL as the following shows:
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By Thm. 4, A∧ (A ⊃ B) ` B is a derivable rule of CL. Since 2 distributes
over true implications (Thm. 3), we get that 2(A ∧ (A ⊃ B) ` 2B, and
since 2C ∧ 2D ` 2(C ∧ D) is a derivable rule of CL, we can infer that
2A ∧2(A ⊃ B) ` 2B. It then easily follows that both
2A ∧2(A ⊃ B) ` 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B)
∼(2A ∧2(A ⊃ B)) ` 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B).
From this, and the fact that excluded middle is a theorem and that reasoning
by cases holds, one can finally infer that ` 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B). 
Corollary 10. CE is not a conservative extension of E, and CE5 is not a
conservative extension of E5.
Proof. This follows from Thm. 6 since
(1) excluded middle is a theorem of E and E5;
(2) by Thm. 3, 2 distributes over true implications in CE and in E5;
(3) by Cor. 1, reasoning by cases is provable for CE and CE5.

«Parenthetical remark. As mentioned introductory-wise, E was origi-
nally got by deleting both δ and γ from Ackermann’s Π′. Both these rules
turn out to be admissible in E, and so the two logics are theorem-vise
identical and so 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is not a theorem of Π′ ei-
ther. Since γ was the only factor needed from CE to prove this sentence
and Π′ has this rule as a primitive, one would be excused for thinking that
something is amiss. The explanation is, however, simply that even though
E and Π′ are theorem-vise identical, they are not identical with regards
to which meta-rules they validate. It can be shown that the γ-rule does
not create problems in the inductive proof of reasoning by cases as in fact
A ∨ C, (A ⊃ B) ∨ C ` B ∨ C is a derivable rule of Π′. However, it does for
the (2`-dist)-rule as any proof of this meta-rule would need to show that
2A,2(A ⊃ B) ` 2B is a derivable rule, which is not the case. However,
since 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is provable in CE it is also provable in the
stronger logic CΠ′, and so Π′ also fails to be conservatively extended by
Boolean negation. End parenthetical.»
7.1. Further possible weakening: disjunctive rules. There is yet another
possible way to significantly weaken the assumptions needed for the proof
to go through: by adding the disjunctive version of every primitive rule, rea-
soning by cases automatically becomes provable as the next lemma shows.
Definition 7 (d-extension). Ld is got from L by adding the disjunctive ver-
sion of every primitive rule of L, that is, if {A1, . . . , An} ` B is such a primi-
tive rule, then Ld has {A1∨C, . . . , An∨C} ` B∨C as an additional primitive
rule.
Lemma 8. The meta-rule of reasoning by cases,
(RbC) A ` C B ` CA ∨ B ` C ,
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holds for any logic L if and only if L = Ld.
Proof. Left for the reader. 
Note that the proof of Thm. 3— the provability of the meta-rule A ` B
2A ` 2B
— holds for BB[eA14|eA15]. However, it does not fully extend to BBd[eA14|eA15],
but, of course if there is a BBd[eA14|eA15]-proof of A ` B which does not
make use of the disjunctive rules, then it is also the case that 2A ` 2B:
Corollary 11. Let L by any extension of BB[eA14|eA15] by rules the main
connective of the conclusion being →, or axioms the main connective of
which are→. Then it holds that if there is a Ld-proof of A ` B which does
not make use of any of the disjunctive rules, then it is also the case that
there is a Ld-proof that 2A ` 2B.
Since Thm. 4 states that A, A ⊃ B ` B is a derivable rule of CBBX and the
proof does not make use of reasoning by cases, it follows from the above
corollary that 2(A ∧ (A ⊃ B) ` 2B holds for CBBd[eA12|eA14|eA15] and
for CBBXd2[eA14|eA15]. We can then use reasoning by cases to infer that
2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B) is also a theorem of of these two logics. We
therefore conclude with the following generalization of Mares’ result:




fail to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation.
This generalizes Mares’ result quite a bit. That it also covers the S5-
extension of E is interesting, but since neither of the commonly refered to
relevant logics weaker than E validate A14 or A15, or their enthymemized
versions, it seems that the generalization does not cover many new logics of
interest. What is interesting, however, is that the result shows that it is not
the S4-characteristics of E which begets the non-conservatively as all of the
following principles fail in BBXd2[eA14|eA15]:
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(Kr) 2(A→ B) ` 2A→ 2B
(T) 2A→ A
(S4) 2A→ 22A
(2/∧-dist) 2A ∧2B→ 2(A ∧ B)
Modally the non-conservativeness proof presented in this paper only needed
that the meta-rule A ` B
2A ` 2B be provable; the other requirements were
either got from the underlying logic—reasoning by cases—or from the
Boolean extension—modus ponens for ⊃. The next section abstracts away
from the particular definition of 2 and shows that the proof also goes through
for any relevant logic extending BBX provided reasoning by cases is avail-
able and the logic has a modal K-operator . This, then, will generalize a
result by Meyer and Mares who showed in [12] that R augmented with a
S4-operator is not conservatively extended by Boolean negation.
16MaGIC will easily verify this, and so I leave it as a MaGICal exercise for the reader to
do so.
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8. Generalizing: non-conservativeness using a primitive modal operator
Meyer proposed in [10] to add a primitive S4 modal operator to the logic
R. That logic, NR is axiomatized by adding to R the following principles:
(NEC) ∅ ` A⇒ ∅ ` A
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
(/∧) A ∧B→ (A ∧ B)
(T) A→ A
(4) A→ A
By using the classical equivalents of (NEC) and (K) one can easily derive
the classical equivalent of the (/∧) axiom. This axiom, however, remains
independent from the others in a relevant context. The proper definition of
the relevant equivalent of the basic modal logic K is therefore as follows:
Definition 8. KL is the logic got by adding (NEC), (K) and (/∧) to L.
Thus KR is a sublogic of Meyer’s NR. Meyer and Mares showed in
[12] that NR is not conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Their
proof is quite similar to that of [8] and is also to the effect that 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃
(2A ⊃ 2B) is a theorem of CNR, but not of NR. Their counter-model to the
extensional K sentence was, like Mares’ counter-model in [8], a Routley-
Meyer model. Unlike, Mares’ model, however, the one presented in [12]
does not validate the Brouwerian axiom. The purpose of this section is to
show that Meyer and Mares’ result can be generalized to cover any logic
between KTW[A12] and the S5-strengthening of Meyer’s NR, which in
this essay will be referred to as 5R and identified as the logic got by adding
to R all of (NEC), (K), (T), (4) and (/∧), as well as the B-axiom:
(B) A→ A.
Theorem 8. (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) is not a theorem of 5R.
Proof. Counter-model displayed in Fig. 3.17

17A few comments on the model in Fig. 3: First of all note that T is not a prime truth-
filter: 2 ∨ 3 ∈ T , although both 2 < T and 3 < T . Furthermore, the model validates not
only (NEC), but even the rule A ` A as T is closed under the -operator. However, by
slightly enlarging its truth-filter, both these shortcomings are rectified: simply enlarge the
T to the prime filter T ′ = T ∪ {2}. It is then easily checked that the model still validates
both adjunction and modus ponens. Since 2 = 0 < T ′, the rule A ` A is not validated
any more. However, every axiom of 5R is assigned a value in T which is closed under
the -operator, and so the model still validates (NEC). Since J(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)K =
3 < T ′, the model withT replaced by T ′, then, still validates every axiom and rule of 5R,
while invalidates extensional K-sentence. Lastly, note that replacing T by T ′ results in an
algebra which is not a model in the sense of MaGIC as T is, but T ′ is not an implicational
filter, meaning that x → y ∈ T ⇔ x ≤ y, where ≤ is the partial order of the algebra: for
instance, 3→ 2 = 2 ∈ T ′, but 3  2.
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⊃ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7
2 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 7
3 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 7
4 3 3 4 3 4 5 6 7
5 2 2 2 4 4 6 6 7
6 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
→ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ∼  
0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 0
1 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 0 3
2 0 5 6 5 6 5 6 7 5 0 4
3 0 2 2 4 4 6 6 7 4 3 3
4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 4 4
5 0 2 2 2 2 6 6 7 2 3 7
6 0 1 2 1 2 5 6 7 1 4 7
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 7 7
Figure 3. 5R-counter-model to (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
Lemma 9.
A ` B
A ∨C ` B ∨C
holds for KL provided it holds for L.
Proof. The proof is simply to confirm that the induction step for (NEC) also
holds, so let D1 . . .Dn be a proof of B from A and assume that A ∨ C ` Di
and D j is got from Di using (NEC). In that case, ∅ ` Di and ∅ ` D j, and so
rather trivially also A ∨C ` D j ∨C. 
Corollary 12. Reasoning by cases holds for CKTW[A12].
Proof. Immediate from Cor. 8 and Lem. 9. 
Lemma 10. A, A ⊃ B ` B is a derivable rule of CKTW[A12].
Proof. Same proof as Thm. 4. 
Lemma 11.
(/`-dist) A ` BA ` B
holds in CKTW[A12].
Proof. The proof simply extends that of Lem. 7; so the task is simply to
confirm that the induction step for (NEC) also holds. Let D1 . . .Dn be a
proof of B from A and assume that A ` Di and D j is got from Di using
BOOLEAN NEGATION AND NON-CONSERVATIVITY I 23
(NEC). In that case, ∅ ` Di and ∅ ` D j, and so trivially also A ∨ C ` D j(=
Di). 
Theorem 9. Any logic between KTW[A12] and 5R is non-conservatively
extended by Boolean negation.
Proof. Same as that of Thm. 6. 
8.1. Possible weakenings. Let’s swiftly consider possible ways of weak-
ening KTW[A12]. First of all one can replace the reductio axiom (A →
∼A) → ∼A with simply excluded middle if the disjunctive rules are added.
Note, though that the meta-rule /`-dist does not hold for logics with more
primitive rules than adjunction and modus ponens as, for instance, ((B→
C) → (A → C)) is not derivable from (A → B) unless A → B is a logical
theorem. If  is to be added to logics with more primitive rules one will
therefore need to add the modal variant of every such rule.
Definition 9. L is got from L by adding for every primitive rule A, . . . , An `
B of L, the rule A, . . . ,An ` B.
Definition 10. Ld is got from L by inductively adding A, . . . ,An ` B
and A ∨C, . . . , An ∨C ` B ∨C for every primitive rule A, . . . , An ` B.
Theorem 10. CL is not a conservative extension of L for any logic between
BBXd and 5R.
Proof. It is trivial to verify that BBXd validates the meta-rules of reasoning
by cases and /`-distribution and has A, A ⊃ B ` B as a derivable rule. The
result therefore follows by the same proof as that given in Thm. 6 together
with the fact that BBXd is a sublogic of 5R. 
This last theorem, then, makes clear that it is only three essential ingre-
dients needed to prove Meyer and Mares’ result, namely
(1) the fact that modus ponens for ⊃ becomes a derivable rule in the
Boolean extension provided excluded middle is a logical theorem
(2) that reasoning by cases is an available meta-rule,
(3) that the modal operator is such as to distribute over every primitive
rule of the logic so as to make the meta-rule A ` BA ` B hold true
of the logic in question.
9. A variation
Restall ended his paper [17] by raising the question whether Routley’s
two favorite logics DKd and DLd are conservatively extended by Boolean
negation. These logics are got by adding to DWd the axiom (A → B) ∧
(B→ C)→ (A→ C) called conjunctive syllogism, as well as, respectively,
excluded middle and reductio. Thus DKd is a sublogic of DLd. Restall’s
question has, to my knowledge, remained an open one ever since.18 It turns
18Restall ended his paper by promising an answer in [18], but no such answer is to be
found therein.
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out that the sentence 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ B), where as before 2A =d f
(A → A) → A, is a theorem of CDKd, but not of DKd, nor of TKd (TWd
extended by conjunctive syllogism and excluded middle).19 The purpose of
this section is to give a quick an easy proof of this. I have not been able to
decide whether DLd is conservatively extended by Boolean negation, and
so this question remains an open one.
Lemma 12. 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ B) is a theorem of CDKd.
Proof. Since both A, A ⊃ B ` B (Thm. 4) and 2C ` C are derivable rules of
CDKd, it follows that so is 2A,2(A ⊃ B) ` B. Thus 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ B)
is derivable from both 2A ∧ 2(A ⊃ B) and from ∼(2A ∧ 2(A ⊃ B)).
Reasoning by cases, then, one can infer that 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ B) is a
logical theorem since (2A ∧ 2(A ⊃ B)) ∨ ∼(2A ∧ 2(A ⊃ B)) is a logical
theorem of CDKd. 
Theorem 11. CDKd and CTKd are not conservative extensions of, respec-
tively, DKd and TKd.
Proof. This follows from the above lemma together with the fact that 2(A ⊃
B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ B) is not a theorem of TKd as the TKd-model displayed in
Fig. 4 falsifies it. 












→ 0 1 2 3 4 ∼ 2
0 4 4 4 4 4 4 0
1 0 1 4 4 4 3 1
2 0 0 1 4 4 2 4
3 0 0 0 1 4 1 4
4 0 0 0 0 4 0 4
Figure 4. TKd-counter-model to 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ B)
Open Problem. Is CDLd a conservative extension of DLd?
10. Summary
I have in this essay shown that modal relevant logics often fail to be con-
servatively extended by Boolean negation. The first such proof was given
by Mares in [8] who showed that the relevant logic E is not conservatively
extended by Boolean negation. This paper provided a new and significantly
easier proof of Mares’ result. Mares’ proof, as well as the one presented
19TKd is an interesting logic as it is, as of yet, the strongest paraconsistent relevant logic
for which naïve set theory—with both the generalized abstraction schema as well as exten-
sionality in axiomatic form—is non-trivial (cf. [5, sect. 6.3]).
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here, is to the effect that the extensional K-sentence 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃
2B) is a theorem of CE—the Boolean extension of E—but not of E itself.
In addition to simplifying the proof considerably, it was also shown that the
nonconservativeness result holds for the S5-extension of E as well as to var-
ious ways of weakening E. This was then further generalized by showing
that the proof also pertains to logics in which the modal operator is taken as
primitive. In such a context it was shown that any sublogic of R augmented
with a primitive S5 modality, but for which excluded middle and reasoning
by cases holds, and for which the modal operator distributes over true impli-
cations so that 2A ` 2B holds if A ` B does, will fail to be conservatively
extended by Boolean negation. The proof, then, not only covers Mares’ re-
sult, but also that of Meyer and Mares who gave a model-theoretic proof in
[12] to the effect that NR—R augmented with a S4 modality—fails to be
conservatively extended by Boolean negation.
That the extensional K-sentence is not a theorem of either E or NR was
first noted in [19] which then mentions a suggestion by Belnap of adding
the axiom 2(A ∨ B) → (2A ∨ 3B) to NR. The Boolean extension of this
logic—known as R4—conservatively extends both R, CR and S4, although
it is not known whether it conservatively extends R4 itself ([12]). I end this
paper, therefore, noting that in light of the fact shown in this paper that the
vast logical space spanning everything from the weak K-ish logic BBXd of
Thm. 10 to the strong S5 extension of NR is marred by non-conservativity
when Boolean negation is added, it seems that the question whether logics
with Belnap’s axiom fare better ought to be more fully investigated.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers for constructive feedback.
References
[1] W. Ackermann. Begründung einer strengen Implikation. 21:113–128, 1956. doi:
10.2307/2268750.
[2] A. R. Anderson and N. D. Belnap. Modalities in Ackermann’s “rigorous implication”.
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24(2):107–111, 1959. doi: 10.2307/2964754.
[3] N. D. Belnap. Entailment and relevance. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 25(2):144–146,
1960. doi: 10.2307/2964210.
[4] R. T. Brady. Gentzenizations of relevant logics with distribution. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 61(2):402–420, 1996. doi: 10.2307/2275668.
[5] R. T. Brady. Universal Logic. CSLI Publication, Stanford, 2006.
[6] S. Giambrone and R. K. Meyer. Completeness and conservative extension re-
sults for some Boolean relevant logics. Studia Logica, 48(1):1–14, 1989. doi:
10.1007/BF00370629.
[7] E. Mares and S. Standefer. The relevant logic E and some close neigh-
bours: A reinterpretation. IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications,
4(3):695–730, 2017. https://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/
ifcolog00012.pdf.
[8] E. D. Mares. CE is not a conservative extension of E. Journal of Philosophical Logic,
29(3):263–275, 2000. doi: 10.1023/A:1004731401855.
26 TORE FJETLAND ØGAARD
[9] W. McCune. Prover9 and Mace4. https://www.cs.unm.edu/~mccune/mace4/,
2005–2010.
[10] R. K. Meyer. Entailment and relevant implication. Logique Et Analyse,
11(44):472–479, 1968. http://virthost.vub.ac.be/lnaweb/ojs/index.
php/LogiqueEtAnalyse/article/view/308.
[11] R. K. Meyer and J. M. Dunn. E, R and γ. 34:460–474, 1969. doi: 10.2307/2270909.
[12] R. K. Meyer and E. Mares. Semantics of entailment 0. In P. Schroeder-Heister and
K. Došen, editors, Substructural Logics. Oxford University Press, 1993.
[13] R. K. Meyer and R. Routley. Classical relevant logics. II. Studia Logica, 33(2):183–
194, 1974. doi: 10.1007/BF02120493.
[14] T. F. Øgaard. Non-Boolean classical relevant logic I. Synthese, 2019. doi:
10.1007/s11229-019-02507-z.
[15] T. F. Øgaard. Boolean negation and non-conservativity II: The variable sharing prop-
erty. Logic Journal of the IGPL, forthcoming.
[16] T. F. Øgaard. Boolean negation and non-conservativity III: The Ackermann constant.
Logic Journal of the IGPL, forthcoming.
[17] G. Restall. Simplified semantics for relevant logics (and some of their rivals). Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 22(5):481–511, 1993. doi: 10.1007/BF01349561.
[18] G. Restall. Four-valued semantics for relevant logics (and some of their rivals). Jour-
nal of Philosophical Logic, 24(2):481–511, 1995. doi: 10.1007/BF01048529.
[19] R. Routley and R. K. Meyer. The semantics of entailment—II. Journal of Philosoph-
ical Logic, 1(1):53–73, 1972. doi: 10.1007/BF00649991.
[20] R. Routley, R. K. Meyer, V. Plumwood, and R. T. Brady. Relevant Logics and Their
Rivals, volume 1. Ridgeview, Atascadero, California, 1982.
[21] J. K. Slaney. A metacompleteness theorem for contraction-free relevant logics. Studia
Logica, 43(1):159–168, 1984.
[22] J. K. Slaney. MaGIC, Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives: Release
2.1 notes and guide. Technical report, 1995. http://ftp.rsise.anu.edu.au/
techreports/1995/TR-ARP-11-95.dvi.gz.
[23] A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell. Principia Mathematica, volume 1. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1910. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/AAT3201.0001.001.
Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen
Email address: Tore.Ogaard@uib.no
